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Implicit and Explicit Alcohol-Related Cognitions
in Heavy and Light Drinkers
Reinout W. Wiers, Nieske van Woerden, Fren T. Y. Smulders, and Peter J. de Jong
Maastricht University
Implicit and explicit alcohol-related cognitions were measured in 2 dimensions: positive–negative
(valence) and arousal–sedation, with 2 versions of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; A. G. Greenwald,
D. E. McGhee, & J. L. Schwartz) and related explicit measures. Heavy drinkers (n  24) strongly
associated alcohol with arousal on the arousal IAT (especially men) and scored higher on explicit arousal
expectancies than light drinkers (n  24). On the valence IAT, both light and heavy drinkers showed
strong negative implicit associations with alcohol that contrasted with their positive explicit judgments
(heavy drinkers were more positive). Implicit and explicit cognitions uniquely contributed to the
prediction of 1-month prospective drinking. Heavy drinkers’ implicit arousal associations could reflect
the sensitized psychomotor-activating response to drug cues, a motivational mechanism hypothesized to
underlie the etiology of addictive behaviors.
During the past 2 decades, alcohol-related cognitions have re-
ceived considerable attention in psychological theories on the
etiology of alcohol use disorders. Several cognitive–motivational
constructs have been proposed to predict alcohol use and abuse,
such as outcome expectancies (e.g., Goldman, Del Boca, &
Darkes, 1999), attitudes (e.g., Burden & Maisto, 2000), and mo-
tives (e.g., Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995). These ap-
proaches have been successful in the prediction of alcohol use and
abuse but have also been criticized on a number of conceptual and
methodological grounds (e.g., Leigh, 1989b). Furthermore, the
validity of self-report measures, commonly used to assess these
constructs, has been criticized on more general grounds (e.g.,
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). For this reason, and because it is unclear
to what extent a questionnaire can tap underlying cognitive moti-
vational processes, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) proposed using
implicit measures that do not rely on self-report to assess attitudes
and related concepts in addition to using explicit measures. In this
study, implicit and explicit alcohol-related cognitions were as-
sessed in light and heavy drinkers and related to prospective
alcohol use.
Explicit Alcohol-Related Cognitions
The cognitive–motivational construct that has received the most
attention in the alcohol field is that of outcome expectancies
(referred to hereafter as expectancies), or the beliefs individuals
hold about the effects of alcohol on behavior, moods, and emotions
(Leigh, 1989b). Since the development of the first alcohol expect-
ancy questionnaires, hundreds of studies have investigated the
relationship between expectancies and alcohol use (Goldman et al.,
1999). Expectancies predict up to 50% of the variance in alcohol
use when structural equation modeling (SEM) is used (e.g., Gold-
man et al., 1999; Leigh & Stacy, 1993; Wiers, Hoogeveen, Ser-
geant, & Gunning, 1997). Expectancies measured in young ado-
lescents significantly predict drinking patterns up to 9 years later,
after controlling for earlier alcohol and drug use (Stacy, Newcomb,
& Bentler, 1991). Given this predictive power, several authors
have argued that expectancies are an important cognitive mediator
in the etiology of alcohol use disorders, mediating more distal
biological and cultural influences (Goldman et al., 1999; Sher,
1991; Wiers, Gunning, & Sergeant, 1998). Current issues in ex-
pectancy research include the relationship between expectancies
and other cognitive–motivational constructs, their structure, and
their assessment using implicit and explicit measures.
Expectancies, Attitudes, and Motives
Attitudes are global evaluations of objects in people’s environ-
ment that perform an important approach–avoidance function (e.g.,
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Attitudes can be measured in
different ways: by directly assessing a global evaluation or, more
indirectly, by multiplying specific expectancies (beliefs) with re-
spect to their subjective value in forming attitudes that predict
alcohol use and abuse through intentions (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen,
1975). Note that in the indirect conceptualization, expectancies
and attitudes are almost identical (the difference is value, but most
expectancies have similar values to most people; Goldman et al.,
1999). However, several studies have shown that global attitudes
and specific expectancies predict unique variance in alcohol use
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and are hardly correlated (Leigh, 1989a; Stacy, Widaman, &
Marlatt, 1990; Wall, Hinson, & McKee, 1998). Stacy et al. (1990)
found that expectancies better predicted 1-month prospective al-
cohol use than did global attitudes, but Burden and Maisto (2000)
found the opposite.
A third cognitive–motivational construct concerns motivation or
motives (e.g., Cooper et al., 1995). In this view, alcohol is drunk
to enhance positive emotions (positive reinforcement motives; e.g.,
fun) or to alleviate negative emotions (negative reinforcement
motives, e.g., tension reduction). In cross-sectional studies, Cooper
et al. found that both motives predicted alcohol use in adolescents
and adults and that related expectancies (of positive and negative
reinforcement) were the main predictors of both motives, which
makes it questionable to what extent the two concepts can be
meaningfully distinguished (Goldman et al., 1999). However, dis-
tinguishing between positive and negative reinforcement expect-
ancies (which are both positive expectancies) appears important,
apart from distinguishing positive and negative expectancies.
Expectancy Structure
The influential review of Leigh (1989b) criticized earlier ex-
pectancy research for relying on exploratory factor analysis and
putting too much emphasis on different subtypes of positive ex-
pectancies. In response to these criticisms, two approaches were
taken: a factor analytic approach using SEM, and an approach
focusing on the underlying memory structure of expectancies. In
the factor analytic approach, expectancies have been conceptual-
ized as higher order factors in relation to valence (positive and
negative; e.g., Leigh & Stacy, 1993) or as higher order factors in
relation to both valence and dose of alcohol (Wiers, Hartgers, Van
den Brink, Gunning, & Sergeant, 2000; Wiers et al., 1997). In both
models, the higher order factors load on more specific first-order
factors (e.g., “fun,” “sex”). Expectancies may also be differenti-
ated with respect to phase of intoxication: During the rising limb
of the blood alcohol curve (BAC), participants expect more (pos-
itive) arousal; later, during the falling limb of the BAC, they
expect more sedation (Earleywine & Martin, 1993).
A second response to Leigh’s (1989b) criticisms was the devel-
opment of an approach in which expectancies are viewed as nodes
in a semantic network (Rather, Goldman, Roehrich, & Brannick,
1992). In this approach, participants respond on a Likert scale to
the phrase “Drinking alcohol makes me . . . . ” for a large number
of adjectives. The expectancy network is constructed using mul-
tidimensional scaling (MDS). Expectancies were found to consis-
tently map on two dimensions: positive–negative and arousal–
sedation, with heavy drinkers expecting more (positive) arousal
and light drinkers more (positive) sedation (Goldman et al., 1999).
The same two dimensions have been distinguished in emotion
research, which is not surprising given that an important function
of alcohol (and other drugs) is to alter emotional states (e.g.,
Goldman et al., 1999; Lang, Patrick, & Stritzke, 1999).
Implicit Alcohol-Related Cognitions
A common potential threat to the assessment of all cognitive–
motivational variables introduced so far is that they rely on self-
report. One may question to what extent a questionnaire can tap
underlying cognitive–motivational processes (Greenwald & Ba-
naji, 1995). Potential problems with explicit measures are self-
presentation (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and
reactivity (for an example in alcohol-expectancy research, see
Wiers, Sergeant, & Gunning, 2000). For these reasons, Greenwald
and Banaji (1995) called for the use of more indirect assessment of
attitudes and related concepts in addition to explicit assessment.
They defined implicit cognitions as “the introspectively unidenti-
fied (or inaccurately identified) trace of past experience that me-
diates a response” (p. 5). In addition, the use of implicit as well as
explicit measures may be of importance because they could tap
different underlying cognitive–motivational processes (Stacy,
1997; Wilson et al., 2000).1
Several approaches have been taken to assess alcohol-related
cognitions in more implicit ways. Stacy and colleagues used a
variety of memory association tasks to tap implicit alcohol cogni-
tions (e.g., Ames & Stacy, 1998; Stacy, 1997). The number of
alcohol-related associations (memory bias) predicted alcohol use 1
month prospectively, after controlling for previous use and explicit
expectancies (Stacy, 1997). Other examples of the use of implicit
techniques in alcohol research are semantic priming (e.g., Zack,
Tonneato, & McLeod, 1999) and implicit priming (e.g., Roehrich
& Goldman, 1995).
The Implicit Association Test
In attitude research, several indirect measures have been devel-
oped (Fazio, 2001; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). The implicit
measures used here are varieties of the Implicit Association Test
(IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). The IAT is a categorization task
that offers a method for indirectly assessing the relative strength of
associations between concepts. Participants sort stimuli into four
concepts, using two responses. Two concepts are the attributes
(typically, positive–negative), and two concepts are the targets
(e.g., typical names for Blacks and Whites in the race IAT). It is
the participant’s task to indicate as quickly as possible to which
category a word belongs. In the critical phases of the IAT, target
and attribute words are mixed (e.g., “For a Black’s name or a
positive word, press the left response key”; “For a White’s name
or a negative word, press the right response key”). The IAT effect
is the difference in reaction times (RTs) for the two combinations
of targets and attributes.2 The IAT depends on the assumption that
RTs are facilitated when strongly associated concepts share the
same response key (e.g., “White name” and “positive”) and ham-
pered when the concepts that share a response key are either
weakly associated or bipolarly opposed (e.g., “Black name” and
1 There are different views on the relationship between implicit and
explicit (alcohol-related) cognitions. In addiction research, Stacy (1997, p.
69) interpreted his findings as support for distinct implicit and explicit
processes that differentially influence behavior. Goldman et al. (1999, p.
236) questioned this interpretation and argued that processes cannot be
separated from their measurement. A similar discussion takes place in basic
cognitive research between adherents of the process-dissociation approach
and those of the task-dissociation approach (Reingold & Toth, 1996). In
clinical research, it seems particularly relevant to investigate whether
implicit and explicit measures predict unique variance in outcome mea-
sures (e.g., Stacy, 1997) or different aspects of behavior (e.g., Dovidio et
al., 2001).
2 The IAT test can be tried out on http://buster.cs.yale.edu/implicit
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“positive”). In this example, a large difference in RT between
phases combining “Black–positive, White–negative” and “White–
positive, Black–negative” indicates a strong implicit racial attitude
(Greenwald et al., 1998).
The psychometric properties of the IAT are rather good. Several
studies reported that the IAT has fairly good test–retest reliability
(about .70), and split-half reliabilities around .90 (Bosson, Swann,
& Pennebaker, 2000; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). Speaking to the
internal validity of the IAT, it has been demonstrated that the IAT
effect is not influenced by the familiarity of items used and that the
IAT cannot be faked (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). Cunningham,
Preacher, and Banaji (2001), using SEM, showed good convergent
validity of the IAT and other measures of implicit attitudes. Dis-
ciminant validity between implicit associations as measured with
the IAT and self-report measures has been demonstrated in a large
number of studies. Typically, the correlation of the IAT and a
related explicit measure is small but not zero (about .25; Dovidio,
Kawakami, & Beach, 2001). Predictive validity has been shown in
studies in which groups differed in expected ways in their implicit
associations (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998). Finally, there are indi-
cations that implicit and explicit measures predict different aspects
of behavior (Dovidio et al., 2001).
Recently, varieties of the IAT have been applied to experimental
psychopathology research of social anxiety (e.g., de Jong, Pasman,
Kindt, & Van den Hout, 2001), phobia (Teachman, Gregg, &
Woody, 2001), eating disorders (Roefs & Jansen, 2002), and
depression (Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001). To our
knowledge, this is the first application of the IAT to alcohol
research.
This Study
We measured implicit and explicit alcohol-related cognitions in
two dimensions: valence (positive–negative) and arousal (arousal–
sedation). These two dimensions were chosen for several reasons.
They were consistently found in semantic memory studies of
expectancies (Goldman et al., 1999) and in emotion research (Lang
et al., 1999). Furthermore, there is evidence that distinct neurobi-
ological processess underlie these two dimensions and that the
sensitized initial arousal reactions to drug-related stimuli are cru-
cial in the development of addiction (Robinson & Berridge, 1993,
2001). Both dimensions were measured implicitly with two IATs
(valence IAT and arousal IAT) and explicitly with paper-and-
pencil tests using the same words. A general expectancy question-
naire was included to measure negative and positive (both positive
and negative reinforcement) expectancies for a low and a high
dose of alcohol (Wiers et al., 1997). Participants were light and
heavy drinking undergraduate university students. On the basis of
MDS research, we predicted that heavy drinkers would score
higher on arousal expectancies than light drinkers and that both
light and heavy drinkers would be moderately positive about
alcohol. Finally, we explored the predictive power of participants’
implicit and explicit alcohol-related cognitions pertaining to
1-month prospective alcohol use.
Method
Participants
Participants were 48 volunteer undergraduate students (24 men, 24
women) of Maastricht University. They were invited on the basis of their
alcohol use and problem scores, reported in a screening 3 months before
the study (N  182). We selected 24 heavy drinkers (12 men, 12 women)
with high weekly alcohol use and high scores on alcohol-related problems
(alcohol use: M  32.0 standard servings3 per week, SD  12.9; alcohol
problems: M  15.8, SD  8.6) and 24 light drinkers (12 men, 12 women)
with low scores on weekly alcohol use and on alcohol-related problems
(alcohol use: M  5.1, SD  4.4; alcohol problems: M  3.6, SD  2.8).
Light drinkers were selected to drink at least one alcoholic drink a week.
Male participants scored nonsignificantly higher on alcohol consumption
than female participants (19.0 vs. 16.6 drinks per week, p  .30) and
alcohol-related problems (11.2 vs. 8.2, p  .25). Mean age was 21.5 years,
with no difference between light and heavy drinkers ( p  .50).
Materials and Measures
Alcohol use. Alcohol use was measured with a self-report question-
naire (Wiers et al., 1997) based on the timeline follow-back method (Sobell
& Sobell, 1990). Self-report measures have been found valid when used in
a research setting with sober participants who are given assurance of
confidentiality (Sobell & Sobell, 1990). These requirements were fulfilled
in our study. Participants indicated on grids how many standard drinks they
consumed of different types of alcoholic drinks during each day of the past
week, and for each day how many drinks they drank on a typical day. With
this questionnaire, estimates for drinking prior to the experiment were
generated. In addition, participants were asked to keep an alcohol diary, in
which they filled out the number of different drinks (and circumstances)
during the 28 days after the second experimental session. From this diary,
prospective alcohol use was calculated.
Alcohol-related problems. The Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index
(RAPI; White & Labouvie, 1989) was used, which measures social and
health-related problems adolescents and young adults had experienced with
alcohol (e.g., not able to do homework because of a hangover). Participants
indicated on a 5-point Likert scale how often they had experienced each
problem. The scale has a high reliability (.80 or higher) and accurately
discriminates between clinical and nonclinical samples. Reported means
for clinical samples on the RAPI are between 21 and 26, indicating that the
average level of alcohol-related problems in heavy drinkers in our study
was at a subclinical level (M  15.8).
Implicit association tasks. Two IATs were presented in balanced order
(valence IAT and arousal IAT). Both contained two sets of two word
categories. The target words always consisted of alcoholic drinks (labeled
alcohol: beer, wine, port, whisky, vodka, rum) and sodas (labeled sodas:
“Coke,” “Cassis,” “Sinas” [the last two are lemonades], “Spa” [sparkling
water], tonic, and juice). The attribute set consisted of either positive and
negative words (valence IAT) or arousal and sedation words (arousal IAT).
For the positive–negative dimension, the following words were used:
positive words (labeled positive) were “sociable,” “good,” “pleasant,”
“nice,” “enjoyable,” “sympathetic”; negative words (labeled negative)
were “antisocial,” “bad,” “unpleasant,” “stupid,” “obnoxious,” “tedious.”
Arousal words (labeled active) were “energetic,” “lively,” “funny,” “cheer-
ful,” “loose,” “aroused”; sedation words (labeled passive) were “relaxed,”
“sleepy,” “woozy,” “quiet,” “calm,” “listless.” The Dutch words were
matched for prevalence and number of syllables.
Each IAT consisted of nine phases that came in one of two orders (see
Table 1; we closely followed the design of Greenwald et al., 1998). Each
IAT consists of two blocks in which the order of the two combination
phases is reversed. The four mixed phases necessary to generate the two
IAT effects per task were given in one of two orders: CRRC or RCCR,
where C stands for combination and R for reversed combination. Every
phase consisted of one practice block and either a single measurement
block (single-dimension discrimination phases) or two measurement
3 A standard alcohol serving in Holland contains somewhat less alcohol
than a standard English or American serving: 12 g versus 14 g.
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blocks (R and C Phases 3, 5, 7, and 9). Each block consisted of 48 words.
Words were selected randomly for each participant (all identical to Green-
wald et al., 1998).
Explicit alcohol-related cognitions. The attribute words used in the
two IATs were used to construct explicit measures of the valence and
arousal dimensions. In line with attitude research, the explicit measure of
the valence dimension consisted of 6 semantic differentials (e.g., “drinking
alcohol is good——bad”), with an unmarked 11-cm visual analogue scale
(VAS) as the response format. This measure is very similar to explicit
measures of global attitudes (e.g., Stacy et al., 1990; Wall et al., 1998) and
is labeled global attitudes. In line with expectancy research, arousal and
sedation were measured with unipolar VAS scales (also 11 cm and un-
marked; e.g., “After drinking alcohol, I become energetic”; disagree——
agree).4 The reliability of these three explicit scales (Global Attitudes,
VAS-Arousal, VAS-Sedation) was reasonably good, and they were not
significantly correlated (Table 2). In addition, participants filled out a more
extensive questionnaire in which four types of expectancies were mea-
sured: positive and negative expectancies for low and high doses of alcohol
(Wiers et al., 1997).5 In line with the motivational framework (e.g., Cooper
et al., 1995), positive expectancies were differentiated into a positive
reinforcement scale (e.g., fun, sex) and a negative reinforcement scale (e.g.,
tension reduction). In order to reduce the number of scales, scores were
combined for a low and a high dose of alcohol. The internal consistencies
of the three resulting scales were all reasonably good (.78–.91; see Table 2).
Procedure
Participants individually performed the two versions of the IAT in a
standard laboratory at Maastricht University on 2 separate days approxi-
mately 1 week apart. After each IAT version, the related explicit measure
followed (e.g., valence IAT followed by explicit global attitudes; total time
was approximately 25 min). We judged that it was better to always
administer the implicit measure first because the carryover effects of
explicit measures to implicit measures appear to be larger than vice versa
(Bosson et al., 2000). The second session ended with the more extensive
questionnaires of expectancies, alcohol use, and alcohol-related problems,
adding about 30 min to the testing. Participants were asked to keep an
alcohol diary in the month after the end of the experiment and send this
(anonymously) to the investigators. Participants received Hfl 25 (about
US$10) for participation.
IAT stimuli. The IAT was programmed in ERTS 3.18 (Beringer, 1996).
Words were presented in black smallfont (14-point) in the middle of the
screen. Feedback appeared in red midfont letters (16-point) 1 inch below
the stimuli words. The category word or words were always presented at
the top of the screen, appropriately positioned on the left or the right side
of the screen, depending on the required response (as in Greenwald et al.,
1998). The interstimulus interval was 250 ms. In case of a wrong response,
the word “ERROR” appeared on the screen. After responses that were too
fast (150 ms) or too slow (3 s), feedback followed (“TOO FAST” or
“TOO SLOW”) with a warning beep.
Procedural variables and data reduction. Half of the participants
received the valence IAT first, and half received the arousal IAT first (the
factor session). For each IAT, half of the participants received the RCCR
order, and half received the CRRC order (the factor order). A third
between-subjects variable was response key (e.g., “soda” started on the left
or right side). All procedural variables were balanced. Data reduction
4 Leigh (1989a, 1989b) demonstrated that the use of a bipolar scale is
unwarranted in expectancy research by comparing three scales, of which
only the bipolar scale failed to predict alcohol consumption in contrast to
two unipolar scales (see also Wiers et al., 1997). However, in attitude
research, the format most commonly used is a bipolar scale. We decided to
use the standard formats used in both research traditions.
5 In fact, the follow-up version of the original expectancy questionnaire
was used, which has the same set-up but some different items. The more
recent version includes three lower order factors for each of the four higher
order factors (positive and negative expectancies for low and high doses
of alcohol). Positive expectancies (both for low and high doses) include
a scale of negative reinforcement and two other scales of positive
reinforcement.
Table 1
Measuring Alcohol Associations With the Valence and Arousal Implicit Association Tests (IATs)
Phase
Valence IAT Arousal IAT
Concept, left hand Concept, right hand Concept, left hand Concept, right hand
1 alcohol soda alcohol soda
2 positive negative active passive
3 (C1) alcohol or positive soda or negative alcohol or active soda or passive
4 soda alcohol soda alcohol
5 (R1) soda or positive alcohol or negative soda or active alcohol or passive
6 soda alcohol soda alcohol
7 (R2) soda or positive alcohol or negative soda or active alcohol or passive
8 alcohol soda alcohol soda
9 (C2) alcohol or positive soda or negative alcohol or active soda or passive
Note. The following explanation is for the valence IAT (for an explanation of the arousal IAT, replace positive
with active and negative with passive): In Phase 1, participants press the left response key when the target word
on the screen is an alcoholic drink (e.g., “beer”) and the right response key when the target word is a soda (e.g.,
“juice”). In Phase 2, participants press the left response key when the target is positive (e.g., “good”) and the right
response key when the target is negative (e.g., “bad”). In Phase 3 (the first combination phase, C), participants
press the left response key when the target is an alcoholic drink or a positive word, and the right response key
when the target is a soda or a negative word. Phase 4 is a reversal of Phase 1 (alcohol and soda are assigned
to the other side). In Phase 5 (the first reverse combination, R), participants press the left response key when the
target is a soda or a positive word, and the right response key when the target is an alcoholic drink or a negative
word. Phase 6 repeats Phase 4, Phase 7 repeats Phase 5, Phase 8 repeats Phase 1, and Phase 9 repeats Phase 3.
The first IAT effect is the difference in reaction times between the 3rd (C1) and the 5th (R1) phase. The second
IAT effect is the difference in reaction times between Phase 9 (C2) and Phase 7 (R2).
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procedures were consistent with other IAT research (Greenwald & Nosek,
2001): RTs below 300 ms were recoded to 300 ms, and RTs above 3,000
ms were recoded to 3,000 ms. Only RTs on correct answers were analyzed.
Results
Explicit Cognitions
The six scales representing the explicit cognitive–motivational
variables were subjected to a 2 (Drinker Type)  2 (Gender)
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Heavy drinkers
differed significantly from light drinkers, F(6, 39)  4.75, p 
.001, and men differed significantly from women, F(6, 39) 3.24,
p  .011, in the absence of a significant interaction, F(6, 39) 
.55, p  .50.6 In order to assess the relative contribution of the
different variables to the MANOVA, a discriminant analysis was
performed that focused on the structure coefficients (Huberty &
Morris, 1989). The relative contributions to the multivariate dif-
ference between light and heavy drinkers were (in descending
order, with structure coefficients in parentheses): global attitudes
(.66), negative reinforcement expectancies (.59), VAS-arousal
(.42), positive reinforcement expectancies (.34), negative expect-
ancies (.10), and VAS-sedation (.05). Inspection of the means
confirmed the expected direction of the effects: Heavy drinkers
had more positive global attitudes and scored higher on positive
and arousal expectancies (Table 3). The relative contributions to
the multivariate gender difference were as follows: VAS-arousal
(.78), positive reinforcement expectancies (.66), VAS-sedation
(.49), negative expectancies (.16), global attitudes (.14), and
negative reinforcement expectancies (.03). Unexpectedly,
women scored higher than men on arousal and positive reinforce-
ment expectancies, and lower on sedation (Table 3).
Implicit Cognitions
RT data and errors for the valence IAT and the arousal IAT are
found in Table 4. Note that the C phases in the valence IAT
(alcohol–positive and soda–negative) were performed more slowly
than the R phases (alcohol–negative and soda–positive), indicating
that both light and heavy drinkers had negative implicit associa-
tions with alcohol. In the arousal IAT, the expected pattern was
found in heavy drinkers: faster responses in the C phases (alcohol–
active and soda–passive) than in the R phases (alcohol–passive
and soda–active), whereas in light drinkers these combinations
were performed about equally fast. The pattern of errors generally
corresponded to the pattern in RTs (as in other IAT research;
Greenwald & Nosek, 2001).
The IAT effects were analyzed with a 3 (within-subjects)  4
(between-subjects) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with
gender, drinker type, and the procedural variables of order (CRRC
or RCCR) and session (valence IAT or arousal IAT in the first
session) as between-subjects variables. Dependent variables were
the RTs on the four combination phases (C or R) for both IATs. In
these analyses, the IAT effect was analyzed as a within-subject
factor (C vs. R), with block (first CR or second CR), and IAT type
(valence vs. arousal) as other within-subject factors. For ease of
interpretation, the combination phases of the valence IAT were
entered in the reverse order from those of the arousal IAT (RC vs.
CR). In that way, both IAT effects were in the same direction,
which made their comparison easier (this procedure is analytically
equivalent to an analysis with the same orders for both versions but
makes the interactions comparable to other IAT research in which
the C phase involves the faster combination). RTs were log trans-
6 We checked whether the nonsignificant gender difference in mean
alcohol consumption accounted for the multivariate difference in explicit
cognitive–motivational variables by running an additional analysis with
mean alcohol consumption as a covariate. The multivariate gender differ-
ence in performance on the explicit measures remained significant, F(6,
38)  2.81, p  .023. Furthermore, an analysis was run with session as an
extra factor (as in the IAT analyses). No session effects were found ( p 
.50).
Table 2
Pearson Correlations and Cronbach Alphas for Implicit and Explicit Cognitions and Alcohol (Ab)use at Time 1
No. of
items  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Valence IAT 2 .58 —
2. Arousal IAT 2 .56 .41** —
3. Global Attitudes 6 .78 .38** .18 —
4. VAS Arousal 6 .88 .10 .03 .05 —
5. VAS Sedation 6 .82 .03 .17 .09 .20 —
6. Pos. Reinforce. Expect. 17 .91 .19 .12 .04 .68*** .05 —
7. Neg. Reinforce. Expect. 10 .81 .18 .20 .32* .22 .30* .49*** —
8. Neg. Expect. 15 .79 .28 .01 .32* .18 .08 .40** .33* —
9. Alcohol (Ab)use 4 .93 .37* .30* .52*** .23 .12 .15 .49*** .16 —
Note. The valence IAT effect was calculated as the mean reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) in the C phases (alcohol–positive, soda–negative) minus
the mean RTs in the R phases (alcohol–negative, soda–positive). Hence, a larger value indicates a stronger negative association with alcohol. The negative
correlation with alcohol use is in the expected direction. The arousal IAT effect was calculated as the mean RTs in the R phases (alcohol–passive,
soda–active) minus the mean RTs in the C phases (alcohol–active, soda–passive). A larger value indicates a larger implicit arousal association with alcohol.
IAT  Implicit Association Test; VAS  Visual Analogue Scales; Pos. Reinforce. Expect.  positive reinforcement expectancies (e.g., fun, sex); Neg.
Reinforce. Expect.  negative reinforcement expectancies (e.g., tension reduction); Neg. Expect.  negative expectancies (e.g., insecure, sick, negative
mood, risk); Alcohol (Ab)use  the combined score of alcohol use during the past week, average weekly alcohol consumption, number of binges during
the past weeks, and alcohol-related problems (Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index).
* p  .05. ** p  .01. *** p  .001.
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formed to increase normality of the distribution (as in other IAT
research). Results were checked for the untransformed RT data;
the pattern of significant effects was exactly the same.
There was a main IAT effect, F(1, 32)  119.44, p  .001,
indicating that C phases were performed faster than R phases. The
IAT-type main effect was also significant, F(1, 32)  24.15, p 
.001, indicating that the IAT effect was larger on the valence IAT
than on the arousal IAT. These effects were qualified by a signif-
icant IAT Effect  IAT Type interaction, F(1, 32)  14.89, p 
.001, and a significant IAT Effect  IAT Type  Drinker Type
interaction, F(1, 32)  5.24, p  .029, the interaction of main
interest (depicted in Figure 1). Note that there are essentially three
IAT effects: a negative implicit association with alcohol for both
light and heavy drinkers, and an implicit alcohol-arousal associa-
tion in heavy drinkers only.
For each of the two IATs, the significance of the IAT effect was
tested for heavy and light drinkers separately with a within-
subjects ANOVA using the mean RTs of C and R phases. The
effect sizes (d) were calculated as the quotient of the difference
between mean RTs of C and R phases and the standard deviation
of this difference. The negative implicit association with alcohol
was significant for light drinkers, F(1, 23)  49.38, p  .001, and
for heavy drinkers, F(1, 23)  14.74, p  .001, with large effect
sizes (ds  1.43 and .78, respectively). The implicit alcohol-
arousal association was significant for heavy drinkers, F(1,
23)  16.53, p  .001 (large effect size: d  .83), but not for light
drinkers, F(1, 23)  1.20, p  .28 (d  .22). An ANOVA
comparing the two mean IAT effects for light and heavy drinkers
indicated that light and heavy drinkers did not significantly differ
on implicit valence, F(1, 46)  1.87, p  .18. The hypothesized
stronger implicit alcohol-arousal association in heavy drinkers as
compared with light drinkers was confirmed, F(1, 46) 3.72, p
.03 (one-tailed).
The next question was whether the IAT Effect  IAT Type 
Drinker Type interaction was moderated by gender. The interac-
tion with gender was not significant (IAT Effect  IAT Type 
Drinker Type  Gender, p  .50). However, the IAT Effect 
Drinker Type  Gender  Session  IAT Type interaction
showed a trend ( p .09), and this interaction qualified three other
significant interactions: IAT Effect  Drinker Type  Gender 
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for the Explicit Cognitive Motivational Variables by Gender and Drinker Type
Variable
Light drinking
women
Light drinking
men
Heavy drinking
women
Heavy drinking
men
M SD M SD M SD M SD
VAS Scale
Global Attitudes 57.6 10.2 59.8 12.5 69.2 12.1 71.3 9.0
Arousal 72.0 12.3 47.4 22.8 76.2 7.9 67.0 12.8
Sedation 44.7 12.5 58.0 23.4 45.4 17.0 54.3 14.5
Pos. Reinforce. Expect. 3.2 0.7 2.5 0.9 3.5 0.6 3.0 0.4
Neg. Reinforce. Expect. 1.9 0.6 2.0 0.6 2.5 0.7 2.6 0.8
Neg. Expect. 1.9 0.5 1.7 0.6 1.7 0.4 1.7 0.5
Note. The Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) are expressed in millimeters as mean scores (0–110; scale midpoint 55). Expectancies are expressed as mean
scores on 5-point Likert scales (midpoint  3). Pos. Reinforce. Expect.  positive reinforcement expectancies (e.g., fun, sex); Neg. Reinforce. Expect. 
negative reinforcement expectancies (e.g., tension reduction); Neg. Expect.  negative expectancies (e.g., loss of control, insecure, sick, negative mood,
risk).
Table 4
Mean Reaction Times (RTs), Standard Deviations, and Errors for Each of the Nine Phases of the Two Implicit
Association Tests (IATs)
Phase
Valence IAT (positive–negative) Arousal IAT (arousal–sedation)
Light drinkers Heavy drinkers Light drinkers Heavy drinkers
RT SD Errors RT SD Errors RT SD Errors RT SD Errors
1 546.2 71.2 2.2 528.4 53.1 2.2 547.9 62.0 2.2 552.0 81.1 1.9
2 601.2 80.7 2.0 579.0 65.9 2.4 722.1 132.9 3.2 707.4 125.9 3.8
3 (C1) 760.0 152.0 6.8 735.4 122.9 7.1 715.7 118.6 4.8 675.6 104.6 7.0
4 537.0 72.4 2.0 512.8 51.2 2.3 560.7 73.2 2.2 526.8 76.6 2.3
5 (R1) 593.9 80.0 3.8 626.5 124.6 5.0 731.8 131.4 5.5 749.1 127.3 7.1
6 540.5 61.3 2.1 521.0 54.2 2.2 543.1 73.1 2.2 530.8 69.6 1.9
7 (R2) 604.2 86.1 4.6 598.7 87.0 5.2 700.4 143.3 5.3 724.9 140.4 6.9
8 546.1 75.3 2.1 515.8 48.3 1.7 538.7 66.1 1.9 531.8 63.4 1.5
9 (C2) 725.4 124.8 6.6 678.3 97.4 7.0 673.3 113.6 5.3 652.6 98.0 5.1
Note. The critical combination phases are the C and R phases. The first IAT effect is the difference between the first C and R phases, the second IAT
effect is between the second C and R phases, and so on (see corresponding Table 1). All RTs are in milliseconds.
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Session, F(1, 32)  6.33, p  .017; IAT Effect  IAT Type 
Session, F(1, 32) 5.01, p .032; and IAT Type Session, F(1,
32)  84.80, p  .001. Therefore, the interaction of main interest
(IAT Effect  IAT Type  Drinker Type) was examined for each
of the four Gender  Session combinations. In the women, the
IAT Effect  IAT Type  Drinker Type interaction was signifi-
cant in the first session, F(1, 8)  7.02, p  .029, but not in the
second ( p  .50). In the first session, the light drinking women
had a stronger negative implicit association with alcohol than the
heavily drinking women (147 ms and 63 ms, respectively), and the
heavily drinking women had a stronger implicit arousal-
association than the light drinking women (105 ms and 63 ms,
respectively), hence a similar pattern as in Figure 1. In the second
session, both light and heavily drinking women showed a strong
negative implicit association with alcohol (188 ms and 184 ms,
respectively) and essentially no implicit arousal association (4
ms and 21 ms, respectively). In the men, the IAT Effect  IAT
Type  Drinker Type interaction was significant in the second
session, F(1, 8)  6.19, p  .038, but not in the first ( p  .50).
Further analyses showed that on the valence IAT, the pattern
reversed in the men: In the first session, a larger implicit negative
association with alcohol was found for the heavily drinking men
than for the light drinking men (100 ms and 38 ms, respectively);
the results were the opposite in the second session (12 ms and 185
ms, respectively). On the arousal IAT, the pattern of results was
similar across sessions: In both sessions, only the heavily drinking
men showed a strong implicit arousal association (70 ms in the
first session and 117 ms in the second session). The light drinking
men did not show an implicit arousal association in either session
(14 and 4 ms, respectively). The pattern on the arousal IAT is
consistent with Figure 1 for men in both sessions. In summary, the
significant difference between light and heavy drinkers on the
arousal IAT is for the men in both sessions and for the women only
in the first session. A negative implicit association with alcohol
was found for men and women in both sessions, with inconsistent
differences in the relative size of this implicit association per
session and drinker type. There were a number of other significant
order effects in both IATs that were generally consistent with other
IAT research.7
Associations With Retrospective and Prospective
Alcohol Use
For further correlational analyses, mean IAT effects were cal-
culated as the mean difference between the C and the R phases. In
Table 2, associations of the different cognitive–motivational vari-
ables with retrospective alcohol use and abuse are presented.8
Explicit global attitudes and negative reinforcement expectancies
were strongly associated with retrospective alcohol use and prob-
lems ( p  .001). The two implicit measures were moderately
correlated with retrospective alcohol use and problems ( p  .05),
both in the expected direction (implicit arousal positively, and
implicit negative valence negatively).
Prospective alcohol use was obtained for 92% of the partici-
pants. Dropouts were 4 heavy drinkers (3 men), who did not return
the alcohol diary despite numerous reminders. There were no
significant differences between these 4 and the 20 remaining heavy
drinkers on any of the alcohol-related variables or age (all ps 
.50). For the remaining 44 participants, prospective alcohol use
was computed from the total consumption of alcohol in the 4
weeks following the experiment. The dependent variable was not
normally distributed but showed the typical left-skewed distribu-
tion of alcohol variables, with values ranging from 0 to 203 drinks
(M  58.4 drinks, Mdn  31 drinks). Therefore, prospective
alcohol use was log transformed. Note that there was no indication
of a bimodal distribution for light and heavy drinkers.
To reduce the number of predictors, we factor analyzed the 8
cognitive–motivational variables (Variables 1–8 in Table 2), using
principal-components analysis followed by oblimin rotation with
Kaiser normalization. Four factors with an eigenvalue above 1
were extracted, explaining 81% of the variance: (a) Positive Re-
inforcement Expectancies (questionnaire and VAS-Arousal); (b)
Global Attitudes Minus Negative Expectancies; (c) Negative Re-
inforcement Expectancies and VAS-Sedation; and (d) Implicit
Associations (mean RTs of valence IAT minus arousal IAT). The
corresponding scales were computed using z-transformed scores
(raw scores were on different scales) and entered into a hierarchi-
cal multiple regression analysis.
The first run of the regression analysis indicated that there was
one influential outlier, which was removed. In Step 1, age and
gender were entered. These variables did not significantly predict
prospective alcohol use, F(2, 40)  1.69, p  .20, R2  .08. In
Step 2, the three composed explicit cognitive–motivational vari-
ables were entered. This significantly increased the variance ex-
7 In line with other IAT research, there was a significant block effect,
F(1, 32)  47.85, p  .001, indicating that responses were faster in the
second block. We only discuss IAT Effect  Block interactions because
interactions not involving the IAT effect are not of interest here. There
were two significant IAT  Block interactions: IAT  Block  IAT
Type  Order, F(1, 32)  36.75, p  .001, which was qualified by a
significant IAT Block IAT Type Order Drinker Type interaction,
F(1, 32)  5.01, p  .032. These interactions were consistent with the
general finding in IAT research, that a larger IAT effect is seen when one
has to change from a fast (easy) combination to a slow (difficult) combi-
nation. In the arousal IAT, this concerned the switch from alcohol–active
(and soda–passive) to alcohol–passive (and soda–active) phases. As indi-
cated earlier, only heavy drinkers showed the IAT effect on the arousal
IAT. Accordingly, the IAT effect was larger in the first than in the second
block in the CRRC order (150 ms and 77 ms, respectively) and larger in the
second than in the first block in the RCCR order (67 ms and 3 ms,
respectively). In light drinkers, the arousal IAT effect was essentially zero
(all 25 ms), except in the second block in the RCCR order (75 ms, which
again concerned a switch from C to R). In the valence IAT, a similar
pattern was observed: In both light and heavy drinkers, the valence IAT
effect was larger in the first than in the second block in the CRRC order
(light drinkers: 203 ms vs. 119 ms; heavy drinkers: 198 ms vs. 78 ms). In
the RCCR order, the expected larger effect in the second block was
observed in heavy drinkers (99 ms vs. 20 ms) but not in light drinkers (124
ms vs. 130 ms). Hence, the order effects in both IATs were generally
consistent with other IAT research, and entirely so for heavy drinkers.
8 For consistency with earlier analyses (and Figure 1), the mean valence
IAT effect was calculated as mean RT in C phases minus mean RT in R
phases (a positive value indicating a negative implicit association with
alcohol). For the arousal IAT, the mean IAT effect was calculated as mean
RT in R phases minus mean RT in C phases (a positive value indicating a
larger implicit arousal association for alcohol). For alcohol use and prob-
lems, one composite measure was calculated consisting of the
z-transformed scores for weekly alcohol use in general and in the past week
for alcohol problems, RAPI, and number of binges (  .93; see Table 2).
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plained, Fchange(3, 37)  8.32, p  .001, R2  .45. The only
significant predictor was the combined scale of global attitudes
and negative expectancies (  .54, p  .001). Both of the other
composed explicit variables predicted nonsignificantly in the ex-
pected direction: positive reinforcement expectancies (  .26,
p  .10) and negative reinforcement expectancies with sedation
(  .22, p  .11). In Step 3, the combined implicit associations
were entered, which significantly increased the variance explained,
Fchange(1, 36)  5.09, p  .03, R2  .52. In the final model,
significant predictors were the combined global attitudes and neg-
ative expectancies (  .50, p  .001) and the combined implicit
associations (  .28, p  .03, in the expected direction:
negative implicit associations minus implicit arousal).
Discussion
The present study compared implicit and explicit cognitive–
motivational variables in light and heavy drinkers, matched for
gender. The first main finding was that on the implicit measures,
heavy and light drinkers differed significantly in their implicit
arousal associations but not in their implicit valence associations.
As hypothesized, heavy drinkers showed strong implicit associa-
tions between alcohol and arousal and light drinkers did not. This
difference between heavy and light drinkers in implicit arousal
associations was paralleled by a difference in explicit arousal
expectancies. Gender effects were not consistent over implicit and
explicit measures: On explicit arousal expectancies, women scored
higher in the absence of an interaction with drinker type, and the
implicit arousal associations were more robust over sessions in
male heavy drinkers. Second, and contrary to our hypothesis, both
light and heavy drinkers showed strong negative implicit associ-
ations with alcohol. The negative implicit association tended to be
somewhat stronger for light drinkers, but this difference was not
significant and varied for male and female participants across
sessions. The negative implicit associations in light and heavy
drinkers contrasted with their explicit positive global attitudes (and
heavy drinkers were more positive than light drinkers). Third,
1-month prospective alcohol use was primarily predicted by ex-
plicit global attitudes, but implicit associations uniquely added to
the prediction.
Implicit Arousal Expectancies
The IAT was developed in social cognition research, in which
attributes are routinely assessed in one dimension only: positive–
negative (valence) to assess implicit attitudes. The present findings
indicate the importance of assessing the arousal–sedation dimen-
sion in addition to the valence dimension in addiction research. In
one other recent application of the IAT to psychopathology re-
search, Teachman et al. (2001) measured implicit associations in
phobics in other dimensions than valence. Although these appli-
cations show promise for experimental psychopathology research,
the present study also indicates a caveat: When more than one IAT
is used, order effects between the different IATs may occur in
addition to the well-documented order effects within an IAT
(Greenwald & Nosek, 2001).
The present finding that heavy and light drinkers differed in
their implicit arousal associations and their explicit arousal expec-
tancies is consistent with semantic network approaches in expec-
tancy research (Goldman et al., 1999). One may question whether
this difference between light and heavy drinkers is caused by their
different drinking histories. Cross-sectional MDS research with
children has indicated that children who drink more also score
higher on the arousal dimension, suggesting that arousal associa-
tions develop with increased use (Dunn & Goldman, 1998). Lon-
Figure 1. Mean Implicit Association Test (IAT) effects for the valence IAT and the arousal IAT, with standard
errors of the means. The difference scores (in reaction times [RT]) were calculated to be in the same direction
for the CR phase of the valence IAT and the RC phase of the arousal IAT. A positive value for the valence IAT
indicates a negative implicit association with alcohol; a positive value on the arousal IAT indicates an implicit
alcohol–arousal association.
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gitudinal research is needed to investigate the directionality of the
alcohol–arousal association.
The finding that heavy and light drinkers primarily differ in their
implicit arousal associations and not in implicit valence could be
related to the incentive–sensitization theory of the etiology of
addictive behaviors, which tries to explain why addiction typically
develops gradually and despite decreased “liking” of the drug
(Robinson & Berridge, 1993). According to this theory, “wanting”
(sensitized arousal) and “liking” (valence) are independent pro-
cesses, with “wanting” rather than “liking” representing the moti-
vational process behind the etiology of alcohol and drug abuse.
With repeated drug use, the mesolimbic dopaminergic “wanting”
system gets sensitized: It shows a progressive increase in the initial
psychomotor activating response to a drug. In this process, “in-
centive salience” is attributed to drug-related stimuli. As a result,
these stimuli will increasingly capture attention with the behav-
ioral outcomes of arousal and craving. Sensitization may occur in
the absence of conscious awareness of participants (p. 254). In
fact, the authors predicted that “much of the time, the attribution of
incentive salience may be more implicit than explicit” (p. 267).
Recently, the authors noted that their theory is now supported by
a wealth of animal data but has not yet been critically tested in
humans (Robinson & Berridge, 2001). The present study may be a
case in point.
Note that the development of implicit drug-arousal associations
as a mechanism underlying the etiology of addiction is related to
the “attentional bias” view, but not equivalent. Several studies
have demonstrated that addicted people show an attentional bias
for cues relating to their drug of abuse (see Franken, Kroon, Wiers,
& Jansen, 2000). From the current perspective, drug cues not only
automatically capture attention but also automatically trigger
arousal associations. These arousal associations could reflect an
appetitive response directed toward the drug, which may occur
outside awareness (an “unconscious emotion”; see Berridge &
Winkielman, in press). Subjective craving could result from be-
coming aware of different aspects of drug-information processing:
attention for a drug cue (attentional bias), a drug-approach action-
tendency (present perspective), or a disrupted, automatized drug
self-administration sequence (Tiffany, 1990).
Implicit and Explicit Cognitive–Motivational Constructs
The second main finding of this study may come as a surprise:
Both light and heavy drinkers showed strong negative implicit
associations with alcohol, whereas their explicit attitudes were
positive, especially in heavy drinkers. A similar dissociation be-
tween implicit and explicit attitudes was found by Swanson, Rud-
man, and Greenwald (2001): Both smokers and nonsmokers
showed strong negative associations with smoking (on the IAT),
and smokers scored higher on explicit attitudes.
These findings could be interpreted as support for the concep-
tual difference between specific expectancies and global attitudes
(see introduction). Global attitudes may reflect society’s stable
negative evaluation of an attitude-object (stigmatization; Swanson
et al., 2001). One may wonder what exactly the attitude-object is
in the present study. De Houwer (2001) showed that the category
labels rather than the individual words determine the IAT effect:
British students showed an implicit preference for “countrymen”
versus “foreigners” (used as labels), even for liked foreigners and
disliked countrymen. Hence, the results on the valence IAT show
that drinkers have a strong implicit negative association with
alcohol, but this does not necessarily reflect their associations with
specific examplars (e.g., beer, wine). Children are primarily neg-
ative about alcohol before they initiate drinking (Wiers et al., 1998,
2000), which probably reflects society’s global negative evaluation
of alcohol. With increased drug use, arousal associations with drug
cues could become more important. A possible explanation for the
relatively positive explicit attitudes of substance users and abusers
is that their (implicit) arousal associations are “mistranslated” into
positive outcomes: Normally, the appetitive response is triggered
by something positive (e.g., food, a sexual partner); however, in
the case of drugs of abuse, this mechanism is triggered by a
sensitized drug cue (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). The underlying
motivational “wanting” mechanism is interpreted as “liking” (“I
often drink, so I must like it”). Another explanation could be that
people have a dual attitude toward alcohol (Wilson et al., 2000).
The finding that explicit and implicit cognitions uniquely contrib-
ute to the variance explained in prospective alcohol use could be
interpreted as support for separate implicit and explicit processes
that influence drug-related decision making (Stacy, 1997; but see
Footnote 1).
Two other cognitive–motivational variables were measured:
negative expectancies and negative reinforcement expectancies.
Both were assessed only with explicit measures in our study (see
Zack et al., 1999, for an implicit assessment of negative reinforce-
ment expectancies) and added little to the prediction of prospective
drinking. Negative reinforcement expectancies may be particularly
important for a subgroup of problem drinkers: those scoring high
on psychiatric distress (Zack et al., 1999). The heavy drinkers in
our study (undergraduate students) drank primarily for reasons of
positive reinforcement (Table 3). Negative expectancies also
added little to the prediction of prospective drinking. It has been
argued that negative expectancies become more important as an
individual experiences more alcohol-related problems (Jones &
McMahon, 1998), which were reported with high frequency by the
heavy drinkers in our study. However, negative expectancies were
measured primarily as opposites of the pleasurable effects of
alcohol (e.g., sad vs. happy). It is possible that a more problem-
focused assessment of negative expectancies associates better with
heavy drinking and motivation to change behavior (Jones & Mc-
Mahon, 1998).
Limitations and Issues for Further Research
The IAT is a promising tool to investigate implicit associations
but does not come without limitations. First, the IAT always
combines two attribute concepts with two target concepts. This
may create some ambiguity in the interpretation of results: For
example, one could argue that the difference between heavy and
light drinkers on the arousal IAT found in our study is due to a
difference in the soda–passive associations rather than the
alcohol–active associations. In the present case, this is very un-
likely given the converging evidence from alcohol expectancy
research (Goldman et al., 1999) and the reported absence of soda
expectancies (e.g., Query, Rosenberg, & Tisak, 1998). Second, the
IAT has a bipolar response format for both attribute and target
concepts. With respect to the target-concepts, the present applica-
tion was relatively unproblematic (the choice between an alcoholic
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drink and a soda is a natural one), but for other applications this
may be more problematic (e.g., defining the opposite of smoking;
Swanson et al., 2001). With respect to the attributes, the bipolar
nature of the IAT can be criticized as well. In attitude research, the
bipolar nature of attitudes is not without critics (Cacioppo &
Gardner, 1999). With respect to the arousal–sedation dimension,
the distinction made in motivational theories between positive and
negative reinforcement is difficult to reconcile with the single
arousal dimension: A heavy drinker may expect both arousal and
“relaxation” (sedation). However, memory research has indicated
that heavy drinkers’ first associations are with arousal (Goldman et
al., 1999), and most strongly so for the rising limb of the BAC
(directly after drinking alcohol; Dunn & Earleywine, 2001). There-
fore, it is likely that this problem only applies to explicit measure-
ment, but future research could address this issue. Third, one may
question the specific words used here. With respect to the targets,
one could, for example, argue that “tonic” is associated with
alcohol or that heavily drinking students associate hard liquor
more with sedation than with arousal (note that, in both cases, the
implicit association would be underestimated here). These sugges-
tions are open to investigation. With respect to the attributes, one
could argue that some of the arousal words used have a positive
connotation (word choice was based on MDS research indicating
that heavy drinkers most strongly expected positive arousal and
light drinkers expected positive sedation). A replication with neu-
tral arousal words would be of interest. However, the findings of
de Houwer (2001) that the IAT primarily measures implicit asso-
ciations between the category labels (hence, alcohol–soda with
active–passive or positive–negative) makes it less likely that the
choice of specific examplars would make much difference. In
future studies, one could use newly developed alternatives for the
IAT, without category labels (de Houwer, 2001).
The sample size of the present study was limited but comparable
to other IAT studies in psychopathology research. The large effect
sizes found for the implicit arousal associations in heavy drinkers,
and for the negative implicit associations in light and heavy
drinkers, strengthens their credibility. Furthermore, the implicit
negative attitudes parallel findings in smoking research, and the
implicit arousal associations in heavy drinkers parallel findings in
expectancy research using more explicit techniques. Future re-
search should determine to what extent the implicit arousal asso-
ciations are moderated by gender. The power of the regression
analysis was relatively small as compared with studies using less
laborious implicit assessment (cf. Stacy, 1997). Therefore, it
would be premature to conclude that prospective alcohol use is
only predicted by explicit attitudes and implicit arousal associa-
tions and that other cognitive–motivational variables play no role.
Moreover, the prospective drinking assessment period (1 month)
was relatively short; a longer time frame would be of interest.
Future studies could further investigate the role of context and
primes on the implicit alcohol associations. We would predict that
implicit arousal associations become stronger in heavy drinkers
after an alcohol-related cue or a sip of alcohol (cf. Jones &
Schultze, 2000). Similarly, alcohol cues may reinstate implicit
arousal associations in abstaining alcoholics (for a similar finding
in depression, see Gemar et al., 2001). From the present perspec-
tive, addicted individuals who try to abstain are torn between
implicit arousal associations, triggered by drug-related cues that
promote continued drug use, and explicit negative expectancies
that promote a discontinuation of drug use. Further studies of
implicit and explicit cognitions together may be of use in preven-
tion and therapy research, both to suggest new interventions (Stacy
& Ames, 2001) and to better understand the effects of existing
interventions. In conclusion, the present study adds to the evidence
that implicit and explicit cognitions can be meaningfully distin-
guished and may differentially influence the development of ad-
dictive behaviors.
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